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Causes of Corruption in Russia: A Disaggregated Analysis 
 
1  Introduction and motivation 
This research uses regional data to formally examine the economic causes of corruption 
across regions of the Russian Federation. Besides providing unique insights into factors 
determining  corruption,  this  paper  contributes  to  the  broader  literature  on  country-
specific corruption studies and provides useful policy inputs. While there are numerous 
studies examining various aspects of cross-national corruption, related investigations 
analysing details of corruption in individual countries are few, due primarily to a lack of 
adequate data on the extent of corrupt activity across regions. In addition, we evaluate 
causes  of  both  corruption  perception  and  actual  corruption  incidence,  which  is  still 
relatively rare in the literature. 
In international  comparisons  of corruption  perceptions,  Russia usually  fares 
relatively  badly.  For  example,  in  2010,  Transparency  International,  the  corruption 
watchdog organization, ranked Russia 154th out of 178 countries in terms of corruption 
perceptions (Transparency International, 2010). While one can debate whether Russia is 
really more corrupt than, say, Haiti, it is clear that corruption is a serious problem in 
Russia, ranging from petty corruption to high-level corruption involving e.g. legislators 
and senior civil servants. This makes studying causes and covariates of corruption all 
the  more  important  for  Russia.  It  is  likely  that  corruption  significantly  influences 




Russians  seem  to  treat  law  enforcement  officials  with  apprehension,  which  has  an 
obvious effect on willingness to obey laws and on contract enforcement.
1 
Russia is a large, geographically and ethnically diverse country. Hence, it is 
natural to assume that corruption also varies between regions. Since 2008, the Russian 
Federation has consisted of 83 federal subjects, while before 2008 there were 89 regions. 
There are all-in-all six different categories of federal subject
2, including two federal 
cities: Moscow and St Petersburg. Regions differ in geographical size, population, 
degree of urbanization and economic structure. We are thus well positioned to assess 
what kinds of factors are associated with corruption in Russian regions. 
Country-specific corruption studies are generally hampered by the availability 
of adequate data, and Russia is no exception. While a handful of papers examine 
corruption in Russia from various points of view ( for more details see Guriev (2007)), 
there is a paucity of papers examining the regional variation in corruption in Russia. 
Regarding the small amount of literature formally studying the determinants of Russian 
corruption, Dininio and Orttung (2005) and Sharafutdinova (2010) use different aspects 
of similar corruption data to us to test primarily political causes of corruption. They 
consistently find that a higher per capita income level decreases corruption. In addition, 
Dininio and Orttung (2005) argue th at the effect of the size of the bureaucracy is 
sensitive to whether population effects are accounted for or not. Since the largest 
number of Russian bureaucrats can be found in Moscow, followed by St Petersburg, this 
                                                           
1 Troika Dialog (2011) reports a Levada Center opinion poll in which 67% of respondents treat 
law enforcement officials ‘probably‘ or ‘definitely’ with apprehension. Only 5% ‘definitely’ 
trust them. 
2 Russia has 21 republics, 9 krais (‘territories’), 46 oblasts (‘provinces’), one autonomous oblast 
(‘The Jewish Autonomous Oblast’ in the Russian Far East), 4 autonomous okrugs (‘autonomous 
districts’) and two federal cities. For the purpose of this study, the administrative differences 




indicates that the two metropolises are likely to lie behind this sensitivity. No other 
(mainly  political)  variable  is  statistically  significant  in  explaining  the  amount  of 
corruption. 
In  another  study,  Demidov  (2005)  looks  into  the  effectiveness  of  the 
President’s special envoys to federal okrugs
3 in tackling corruption. In principle, special 
envoys could be effective e.g. in tackling corruption among the governors of different 
regions. However, Demidov’s view is that they certainly had no positive influence on 
corruption, and, in some cases, the envoys and their staff seem to have increased the 
level of corruption. Further, Mokhtari and Grafova (2007) develop a model where tax 
inspectors  are  potential  bribe-takers,  and  therefore  an  increase  in  the  number  of 
inspectors can actually decrease tax revenue, ceteris paribus. In their empirical study, 
too, they find that the number of tax inspectors is negatively related to per capita tax 
collection. The authors conclude that bribe-taking in the tax administration explains the 
result. Our contribution is quite different from Mokhtari and Grafova (2007). While 
their theoretical model was concerned with bribe-taking, their empirical model did not 
include any variables directly dealing with corruption. Instead they relied on indirect 
inference regarding the level of corruption in Russia’s tax administration. 
In actual fact, these studies do not formally examine the distinction between 
perceived  and  actual  corruption.  We,  in  contrast,  are  able  to  look  directly  at  the 
correlation  of  corruption  incidence  and  perceptions  with  respect  to  a  variety  of 
economic and social variables. We find that higher income levels tend to decrease both 
the perception of corruption and its incidence. This result holds for several different 
                                                           
3 To ease administration of the Federation, President Putin divided the country initially into 




measures of income. In this respect our results mirror those obtained in cross-country 
studies  (Serra  (2006)),  among  others.  Higher  population  seems  to  increase  both 
corruption incidence and perception, although the effect is non-linear. It is interesting 
that variables relating to the scope of government activities at the regional level do not 
have statistically significant effects on corruption. Another noteworthy finding is that in 
Moscow and St  Petersburg, the two main seats  of political  and economic power in 
Russia, the perception of corruption is lower, while the actual incidence of corruption is 
higher than elsewhere. It may be that wealthier people in the two largest cities do not 
perceive corruption as one of their key problems, while e.g. businesses are required to 
pay more bribes in these two cities than elsewhere. Urbanization reduces corruption 
perceptions, but not incidence. People in larger cities may find it harder to track the 
actions of other citizens as well as civil servants. Finally, the effects of competition in 
the  marketplace  are  different  on  perceived  versus  actual  corruption.  Having  more 
companies per capita increases corruption perception, perhaps because people perceive 
companies to be competing for favours vis-à-vis the public sector. However, this effect 
does not show up in the data on the incidence of actual corruption. 
 
2  Model, estimation and data 
2.1  Theoretical background 
The theory relating to the causes of corruption is tied to the broader literature on the 
causes of criminal activity, where bribe-takers and bribe-givers weigh the relative costs 
and benefits of their actions (Becker, 1968). For instance, increases in general economic 




raising  the  costs  of  apprehension  and  punishment  for  perpetrators.  Building  on  this 
general theme, other scholars, notably Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993), have framed theories specific to corrupt activity. In this context, the role of the 
government, including its ability to generate red tape and disburse favours out of turn, is 
a crucial determinant of corrupt activity (Guriev (2004)). Government agencies often 
hold  monopoly  powers  on  disbursement  of  contracts,  which  presents  unique 
opportunities for rent-seeking. Competition among favour-seekers (including the public 
as well as large and small businesses), on the other hand, induces some with resources 
to offer higher bribes. Further, even when some government enterprises are privatized 
(as has been the case especially in transition economies, including Russia), this creates 
additional  avenues  for  generating  rent  (Kaufmann  and  Siegelbaum  (1997),  Varese 
(1997)). Finally, anti-corruption initiatives are likely to be tied to the economic status of 
regions (Boerner and Hainz (2009)). In the empirical model below, we take account of 
the role of the government in terms of its possible impact on corruption. 
Empirical  studies  of  corruption  have  mainly  used  cross-national  indices  of 
corruption, in recent years examining numerous determinants to such an extent that this 
line of inquiry seems to have reached saturation point (see Aidt (2003), Jain (2001), 
Lambsdorff  (2006),  Pellegrini  and  Gerlagh  (2008),  Serra  (2006)  for  reviews  of  the 
extant literature).  Country-specific studies are quite limited, primarily due to a paucity 
of acceptable corruption data (exceptions include Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Goel and 
Nelson (2011) for the United States, and Dong and Torgler (2010) for China). The 
present research adds to the literature by examining causes of corruption across Russian 
regions. There have only been a few formal studies of corruption in Russia,
4 although 
                                                           




the country has some unique attributes that could crucially impact the level of corrupt 
activity, notably its sheer size and the transition to a market economy.
5 
2.2  Estimation model 
Following the above discussion, and based on the overall literature on the causes of 
corruption (see Aidt (2003), Jain (2001), Lambsdorff (2006), Serra (2006), Svensson 
(2005),  Treisman  (2000)),  our  general  estimated  equation  to  explain  the  causes  of 
corruption across Russian regions takes the following general form (with subscript i 
denoting a Russian region): 
Corruptionij  =  f  (Economic  statureik,  Government  roleim,  Populationi,  Competitioni, 
Privatizationi,  Urbanin, Unemploymenti)        (1) 
        i = 1, …, 40 
        j = CORRperc, CORRamt 
        k = GRPpc, INCpc 
        m = GOVTemp, GOVTtran 
        n = Urbanization, DUMmspt 
The dependent variable is alternately measured as an index of corruption perceptions 
(CORRperc) and as an index of corruption incidence (CORRamt). Both indices range 
from zero to one, with one denoting the highest level of corruption.
6 While appropriate 
                                                           
5 See Levin and Satarov (2000) for an illuminating general discussion. See also Cheloukhine 
and King (2007), Osipian (2010) and Safavian et al. (2001). 
6 In the formal estimation, we take the natural logarithms of both  CORRperc and CORRamt to 
unbind them. This transformation, however, results in the loss of one observation, as a natural 




caution should be used in interpreting the indices, the mean on CORRperc in the sample 
is greater than that on CORRamt → 0.59 versus 0.44. Further, the correlation between 
the two corruption measures is a modest 0.31 (see Table 3). A list of regions included in 
the sample is provided in the Appendix. 
This  alternative  treatment  of  the  dependent  variable  provides  a  useful 
robustness  check,  especially  given  some  criticisms  in  the  literature  regarding  the 
shortcomings of corruption perception indices (Olken (2009), Sampford et al. (2006)). 
Further, the determinants of corruption have been shown to be somewhat sensitive to 
the measure of corruption employed. For example, see Goel and Nelson (2011) for 
evidence related to the United States and Treisman (2007) for cross-national evidence.
7 
In  line  with  the  literature  that  takes  economic  prosperity  to  be  a  strong 
determinant  of  corruption  (see  Gundlach  and  Paldam  (200 9),  Serra  (2006);  also 
Bardhan (1997) for a broader discussion), the economic status of a region is included by 
using two different measures: (i) gross regional product per capita ( GRPpc); and (ii) 
regional income per capita (INCpc). The use of different prosperity measures should 
provide  a  useful  test  of  the  validity  of  the  findings.  In  our  sample,  the  correlation 
between GRPpc and INCpc is 0.84 (Table 3). The overall idea is that improvement in 
economic well-being reduces corruption, either by increasing governmental resources 
devoted to anti-corruption efforts or by increasing the opportunity costs for illegal acts 
by both bribe-takers and bribe-givers (Boerner and Hainz (2009)). 
The  role  of  government  is  crucial  in  both  generating  and  combating  rent-
seeking activities (see Rose-Ackerman (1999), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) for general 
                                                           
7 Even in this broader literature, however, there is no evidence of consistent and comparable 




discussion, and Levin and Satarov (2000) for related discussion specific to Russia). 
Government employment (GOVTemp) can proxy for the size of bureaucracy,
8 although 
some public employees may be involved in fighting corruption (e.g., judicial and police 
employment). Further, governments routinely make transfe r payments (grants), which 
provides opportunities for rent -seeking for officials in charge of disbursements. We 
account for this aspect by including transfers from the federal government to regional 
governments (GOVTtran). 
Population (POP) is included to account for the physical size of regions and to 
capture the competition for favours (see Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Glaeser and Saks 
(2006) for a similar consideration in the case of the United States). Other things being 
the same, greater population would increase corrupt activity, although there might be 
some nonlinearities in the relation between corruption and population. While population 
captures  general  competition  for  favours,  we  include  the  number  of  enterprises  per 
capita (Compete) as a measure of market competition and to capture competition for 
favours from businesses. The comparison of relative effects of general favours sought 
by the population versus those by businesses is a novel angle studied in the literature. 
Privatization  creates  opportunities  for  rent-generation  through  the  sale  of  favours, 
although it is possible that, over time, corruption might even be greater in the absence of 
privatization  (Kaufmann  and  Siegelbaum  (1997)).  The  link  between  privatization  in 
transition economies and the level of corrupt activity has been recognized by several 
scholars (see Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) and Varese (1997) for examples). It 
would be interesting to study whether privatization matters in terms of its impact on 
corruption after the heavy phase of privatization in the initial transition years ended. We 
                                                           
8 Doninio  and  Orttung  (2005)  alternatively  measure  the  size  of  bureaucracy  by  the  (non-




use the number of public enterprises privatized per capita (Privatize) in each region to 
capture the influence on corruption perceptions and incidence. Besides the comparative 
effects on perceptions versus incidence, the use of hard privatization data (as opposed to 
indices of privatization) can be seen as a contribution to the broader corruption literature. 
Competition for favours and risk of exposure for corrupt acts might also be 
greater in urban areas. The degree of urbanization (URBAN) is accordingly included in 
the estimations (see Glaeser and Saks (2006)). 
Further, two Russian regions, Moscow and St Petersburg, are large urban areas, 
as well as the main seats of political and economic power. Other things being the same, 
there  is  likely  to  be  greater  competition  for  favours  and  greater  government 
disbursements in these regions. To take this into consideration, we include a dummy 
variable, DUMmspt, that takes the value one if the region is Moscow or St Petersburg 
and zero elsewhere.  Finally, the impatience of bribe-givers to offer bribes might be 
greater in periods of high unemployment (UN), as there are more unemployed vying for 
jobs and some might be willing to offer bribes to secure government jobs and contracts. 
2.3  Data 
The data on corruption are from the Russian arm of Transparency International. While 
these data come from a reputable organization and provide a consistent measure of 
corrupt  activity,  they  are  not  without  some  shortcomings  –  the  main  ones  being 
availability for one year only (2002) and the limitation to only forty regions (out of a 
total of 89, although the most important ones are included – see Appendix for a list of 
included regions). However, the data are quite representative of geographical, industrial 




see Transparency International (2002). In the absence of a better measure of corruption, 
and to provide formal insights into causes of corruption in Russia using this unique 
insight, we limit the study to 2002 and to forty regions. One virtue of using the 2002 
data is that this period is unlikely to be picking up disproportionately high corruption 
associated with nascent institutions and large-scale privatization in the initial transition 
years (see Andvig (2006), Levin and Satarov (2000), Osipian (2010)). 
We utilize both corruption perception and incidence data, as this is more likely 
to give a more nuanced picture of the situation. The underlying data is collected from 
surveys  of  both  individuals  and  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises.  Corruption 
perception means correspondents’ general perception of corruption (everyday, related to 
different levels of administration etc.) in their region. The corruption incidence index is 
based on data from questions relating to the frequency and amounts of bribe-giving the 
respondents themselves had been associated with. 
The  data  for  the  other  variables  come  mostly  from  the  Russian  Federal 
Statistical Service (www.gks.ru). Details about the variables used, summary statistics and 
data sources are provided in Table 1, while Table 3 provides pair-wise correlations. 
 
3  Results 
All  cross-sectional  estimations were conducted using the STATA software package, 
with OLS used as the estimation technique.
9 The estimation results are reported in Table 
2. Panels A and B, respectively, in Table 2 report results with alternative measures of 
                                                           
9 The relatively modest sample size and its cross-sectional dimension place some limitations on 




corruption  as  the  dependent  variable  –  corruption  perceptions  (CORRperc)  and 
corruption incidence (CORRamt). The different models in Table 2 have a reasonable fit, 
especially given the relatively small size of the sample. 
As a general test of specification, we performed a RESET test. This generally 
showed an absence of significant specification error in all cases – i.e. the resulting chi-
squared statistic was statistically insignificant at the five per cent level in all instances. 
The following aspects are noteworthy across determinants of corruption perceptions and 
incidence, respectively. 
3.1  Determinants of corruption perceptions 
  Greater  economic  prosperity  reduces  corruption  perceptions.  This  finding  is 
robust across the two measures: GRPpc and INCpc.
10 It is likely the case that 
more prosperous regions have greater anti -corruption measures and relatively 
prosperous  individuals  are  dissuaded  from  engaging  in  illegal  corrupt 
activities.
11 
  The  role  of  government,  measured  alternately  by  government  employment 
(GOVTemp)  or  via  government  transfers  (GOVTtrans),  does  not  appreciably 
affect corruption perceptions.
12 
  Greater  population  density  (POP),  signifying  competition  for  favours  among 
bribe-givers, increases corruption perceptions, albeit the relation appears to be 
                                                           
10 Potential reverse causality from corruption to prosperity is somewhat mitigated by the cross-
sectional nature of the analysis. Recent research has, in any case, shown that the main direction 
of causality runs from prosperity to corruption (Gundlach and Paldam (2009)). 
11 See Gundlach and Paldam (2009) for support for this finding in a cross -national context, and 
Sharafutdinova (2010) for Russia. 
12 It is possible, however, that inclusion of governmental data at a finer level of detail could 
provide greater insights, as has been seen in regards to other countries. See, for example, 




nonlinear.  Nonlinearities  between  corruption  and  its  determinants  are  largely 
ignored in related studies (Serra (2006)). 
  Greater  competition  between  firms  (Compete),  on  the  other  hand,  strongly 
contributes to corruption perceptions in all instances. Bribe-giving by firms can 
be perceived to be widespread, both among the general population and vis-à-vis 
other companies. 
  Greater  privatization  does  not  affect  corruption  perceptions.  The  resulting 
coefficient is statistically insignificant. It is likely the case that after the initial 
phase of privatization, further privatization was more sporadic. 
  The unemployment rate (UN) does not show appreciable impacts on the level of 
corrupt activity (see Sharafutdinova (2010) for similar findings). 
  Greater  urbanization  (URBAN)  lowers  corruption  perceptions.  The  intuition 
behind this finding is that greater urbanization is acting as a deterrent, with both 
bribe-takers and bribe-givers being somewhat dissuaded by the relatively greater 
risk of exposure in urban areas. There is also generally greater media attention 
on corrupt activities in urban areas. 
  Consideration of another dimension of urbanization by separately focusing on 
the largest metropolitan areas produces different findings. The dummy variable 
identifying  the  two  large  metropolitan  areas  of  Moscow  and  St  Petersburg 
(DUMmspt) is negative and significant in all instances. Controlling for various 
factors,  corruption  perceptions  were  lower  in  the  largest  urban  regions. 
Interestingly, this also holds when the degree of urbanization is controlled for 
(Model 5A). 




3.2  Determinants of corruption incidence 
  As before, greater GRPpc and INCpc lower corruption incidence. The findings 
with regard to the negative effect of GRPpc on corruption incidence support 
earlier literature on Russian corruption (Dininio and Orttung (2005)) as well as 
the  broader  literature  on  corruption  determinants  (see  Gundlach  and  Paldam 
(2009); and Lambsdorff (2006) and Serra (2006) for literature reviews). The 
significance of different economic prosperity measures in reducing corruption 
perceptions as well as corruption incidence is noteworthy, especially given the 
modest correlation between the two corruption measures (Table 3). 
  The effects of the two government variables (GOVTemp and GOVTtran), and of 
those  of  urbanization  and  unemployment,  are  statistically  insignificant  on 
corruption incidence as well as corruption perceptions. 
  Regional population (POP) again shows nonlinearities in terms of its effects on 
corruption,  although the quadratic term  is  now significant  in  one of the two 
cases (Model 2B with INCpc denoting economic prosperity). 
  A  more  striking  contrast  across  corruption  causes  emerges  with  regard  to 
Compete. Greater market competition does not significantly affect corruption 
incidence. Thus, while competing firms are perceived to seek favours via bribery, 
these efforts are not registering in terms of increases in actual corruption. 
  Privatization,  like  its  effect  on  corruption  perceptions,  fails  to  show  up  as 
significant  in  corruption  incidence.  From  a  political  perspective,  additional 
privatization in the decade following the breakup of the Soviet Union seems 




  Corruption incidence is found to be greater in the Moscow and St Petersburg 
regions, ceteris paribus, especially in the models where population effects are 
directly accounted for (Models 1B and 2B). This result is consistent with the 
notion that there is greater disbursement of favours in large government seats, 
trade  centres  and  major  ports  (see  Goel  and  Nelson  (2011)).  Again,  it  is 
noteworthy that in the two largest cities, corruption perception is lower than 
incidence. 
Besides the differences across the determinants of perceived and actual corruption noted 
above, several other points seem significant. Firstly, in terms of magnitude, increases in 
economic prosperity have a greater (negative) effect on corruption incidence than on 
corruption perceptions. This is true for both measures of prosperity employed and is 
consistent  with  intuition.  Secondly,  the  effects  of  government  employment  are 
insignificant. (Findings for corruption across US states in this regard are mixed, see e.g. 
Glaeser  and  Saks  (2006)  and  Goel  and  Nelson  (2011).)  Thirdly,  the  effects  for 
urbanization are found to be negative on corruption perceptions, but not on incidence 
for Russia. (The evidence for the US is mixed in this regard. Some have found the 
effects of urbanization to be significant (Goel and Nelson (2011), while others have not 
(Glaeser  and  Saks  (2006).)  Fourthly,  employing  ‘hard’  data  on  the  number  of 
enterprises privatized, we find that privatization has no impact on actual or perceived 
corruption.  Fifthly,  there  is  a  marked  difference  in  the  impact  of  the  two  largest 
metropolitan regions in terms of their impacts on perceptions and incidence. The two 
main seats of power have higher incidence of corruption, while corruption perceptions 
are  lower.  Finally,  greater  market  competition  between  firms  increased  corruption 




4  Conclusions 
This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  on  country-specific  studies  of  corruption  by 
examining economic causes of corruption across Russian regions. Specific contributions 
include: (i) formal study of corruption causes across Russian regions; (ii) comparisons 
of  determinants  of  perceived  corruption  and  those  of  actual  corruption;  and  (iii) 
examining the influence of the size of the enterprise sector on corruption. 
Our results show that economic prosperity, population, urbanization, market 
competition  as  well  as  large  metropolitan  regions  are  significant  determinants  of 
Russian  corruption,  with  often  significant  variations  in  explaining  perceived  versus 
actual  corruption.  The  negative  effect  of  economic  prosperity  supports  the  larger 
corruption determinants literature (see Gundlach and Paldam (2009) and Serra (2006), 
and the effect on corruption incidence supports earlier findings for Russia (Dininio and 
Orttung (2005). In terms of magnitude, increases in economic prosperity (negatively) 
impact corruption incidence more than they do corruption perceptions. On the other 
hand, the effects of government employment and transfers as well as unemployment are 
statistically insignificant. Related findings  for these factors from  other countries  are 
mixed (Fisman and Gatti (2002), Glaeser and Saks (2006), Goel and Nelson (2011)). 
Greater market competition increases corruption perceptions, but not incidence. This 
finding can be seen as tying into the cross-national literature that has found greater 
economic freedom lowers corruption (Goel and Nelson (2005)). However, unlike the 
cross-national literature, our measure of economic freedom is based on hard data (i.e. 





The  use  of  alternative  measures  of  corruption  provides  some  interesting 
insights.  While  economic  prosperity  and  population  have  a  similar  impact  on  both 
corruption perceptions and corruption incidence, there is a stark difference with regard 
to  the  main  metropolitan  areas  of  Moscow  and  St  Petersburg,  and  with  respect  to 
number  of  enterprises.  Unlike  corruption  perceptions  (which  are  consistently  lower 
across all models), the incidence of corruption is shown to be greater in the two main 
metropolitan areas and the resulting effect is significant in two instances. Further, it 
seems that a vibrant economy and economic freedoms, as measured by the number of 
per capita enterprises, lead to higher corruption perceptions, i.e. people feel something 
illegal must be taking place as the number of enterprises grows. However, the actual 
incidence of corruption does not increase.  
From a policy perspective, we can make a few recommendations for corruption 
control across Russian regions. Firstly, as regions attain greater economic prosperity, 
the level of corrupt activity (both perceived and actual) will tend to decline. Hence 
policies supporting economic development are recommended for corruption control as 
well.  Secondly,  policies  to  combat  corruption  in  large  areas,  denoted  by  large 
population, might need to be different. Thirdly, while policymakers strive to get a better 
handle on how corruption is measured (see Olken (2009), Sampford et al. (2006) for 
related discussion), they should be careful to distinguish between perceived and actual 
corruption, as evidenced by our results for the number of enterprises. Perceptions about 
corruption  might  be  quite  different  from  reality  also  with  regard  to  the  two  main 
metropolitan areas. However, the size of the public sector does not seem to appreciably 
contribute to corruption. 
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Table 1  Variable definitions, summary statistics and data sources 
Variable  Definition 
(mean; standard deviation) 
Source 
CORRperc  Index  of  corruption  perceptions,  higher  values 
greater  corruption,  range:  0–1;  2002,  (0.587; 
0.208) 
Center Transparency International 
– Russia (transparency.org.ru) 
CORRamt  Amount  of  corruption,  higher  values  greater 
corruption, range 0–1; 2002, (0.443; 0.297) 
Center Transparency International 
– Russia (transparency.org.ru) 
GRPpc  Gross  revenue  product  per  capita,  2002,  current 
prices, roubles, (56,417.860; 42,610.290) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
INCpc  Per capita household income, 2002, current prices, 
roubles, (3,541.750; 1,809.694) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
POP  Regional  population,  2002,  thousand  persons, 
(2,671.783; 1,852.006) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
Compete  Regional  enterprises  per  1000  inhabitants,  2002, 
(23.613; 12.770) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
GOVTemp  Regional  government  employment,  2002,  %  of 
average annual employment in economy, (1.952; 
0.415) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
GOVTtran  Transfers from the federal government per capita, 
2002,  current  prices,  thousand  roubles,  (1.819; 
1.607) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
Privatize  State enterprises privatized per 1000 inhabitants, 
2002, (0.021; 0.021) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
URBAN  Regional urbanization rate, 2002, %, 
(72.935; 10.669) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
UN  Regional unemployment rate, 2002, %,  
(1.868; 0.873) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
DUMmspt  A  dummy  variable  that takes  the  value 1  if  the 
region is Moscow or St Petersburg 
 
 
Note: All observations are for the year 2002 or the closest year available and are for the 40 Russian 
regions for which we have corruption data. 
 





Table 2  Causes of Corruption Across Russian Regions  
Panel A: Determinants of corruption perceptions 
Dependent Variable = Log (CORRperc) 
  1A  2A  3A  4A  5A 
GRPpc  -3.84e-06** 
(5.4) 






INCpc    -0.0001** 
(3.9) 
     




     
POP




     
















Privatize        -0.26 
(0.1) 
 
URBAN          -0.01* 
(2.0) 
UN          -0.07 
(1.0) 




























Panel B: Determinants of corruption incidence 
Dependent Variable = Log (CORRamt) 
  1B  2B  3B  4B  5B 
GRPpc  -0.00001** 
(6.2) 






INCpc    -0.0004** 
(5.2) 
     




     
POP




     
















Privatize        -9.51 
(0.8) 
 
URBAN          -0.002 
(0.1) 
UN          -0.04 
(0.3) 
























N  39  39  39  34  39 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions. Constant included but not reported. Absolute t-statistics based 
on robust standard errors. * and ** respectively denote denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































List of regions in the sample 
 
Altai Krai  Primorski Krai 
Amur Oblast  Pskov Oblast 
Arkhangelsk Oblast  Rostov Oblast 
Bashkortostan  Ryazan Oblast 
Belgorod Oblast  Samara Oblast 
Chelyabinsk Oblast  Saratov Oblast 
Karelia  St.Petersburg 
Kemerovo Oblast  Stavropol Krai 
Khabarovsk Krai  Sverdlovsk Oblast 
Krasnodar Krai  Tambov Oblast 
Krasnoyarsk Krai  Tatarstan 
Kurgansk Oblast  Tomsk Oblast 
Leningrad Oblast  Tula Oblast 
Moscow  Tumen Oblast 
Moscow Oblast  Tver Oblast 
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast  Udmurtia 
Novgorod Oblast  Ulyanovsk Oblast 
Novosibirsk Oblast  Volgograd Oblast 
Omsk Oblast  Voronezh Oblast 
Perm Oblast  Yaroslavl Oblast 
 
Note: For details see Transparency International, Regional Corruption Indices 2002, 
http://transparency.org.ru/proj_index.asp, Moscow: Transparency International, 2002. 